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Abstract
WTOrulesprohibit“disguisedprotection” in the formofdomesticpolicies.Howthendogovernmentscooperate
over trade and domestic policies when none can verify whether a nation's domestic tax reduction is a protective
measure or a reaction to a production externality? In this paper, each government privately observes whether a
production externality associatedwith its import-competing good is high or low. This paper finds that in an optimal
agreement, disguised protectionwith domestic policies is never used by governmentswith a high externality, and is
never commonly realized. Moreover, in an optimal agreement, tariffs may be conditional on domestic policies.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Tariffs have significantly been reduced under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
(WTO, formerlyGATT). Alongwith (and perhaps because of) this reduction, domestic policies such
as production taxes and subsidies are receiving increased attention as a means of trade protection.
Under WTO rules, however, member governments are not allowed to use domestic policies as
protective measures. GATT Article III prohibits “disguised protection” in the form of domestic
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policies. Further, when a country is adversely affected by its trading partner's domestic policies, it is
entitled to bring a “non-violation” complaint, permitted by GATTArticle XXIII, even if the trading
partner broke no explicit WTO rules. The non-violation complaints thus act as a legal framework
under which member countries are ensured against the opportunistic use of domestic policies.
This paper examines how member governments cooperate over trade and domestic policies
when they have the incentive to use domestic policies as disguised protection. To this end, it
considers a two-good, two-country partial equilibrium model, and finds a self-enforcing policy
agreement in an infinitely repeated game. In the model, there is a domestic production externality
associated with the import-competing good and an international pecuniary externality due to the
terms-of-trade effects. Production externalities are assumed to be either high or low. To simplify
the exposition, we focus our attention on negative externalities, taking externality levels to be
either high or low cost. The first-best policies are free trade and Pigouvian domestic tax.
The novel feature of our analysis is that at the time of making policy choices, governments are
privately informed about externality levels. The implication of this is that, after agreeing on free
trade, the “high-cost government” can set the low tax assigned to the “low-cost government” to
improve its terms of trade without being detected as a deviation. When a government unilaterally
raises its trade barrier by reducing the domestic tax applied to its import good, the off-shore price
of the import good (the world price) goes down. Such a policy measure then causes a redis-
tribution of surplus from foreign exporters, who receive lower prices, to the domestic country.
This terms-of-trade effect serves to lower the cost to the domestic government of providing
additional protection to its import-competing producers.1
Trade and domestic policy choices here are incentive compatible. This means that a self-
enforcing policy agreement is subject to (i) the “on-schedule” constraints that each government
truthfully chooses the policy choices assigned to its cost type and (ii) the “off-schedule”
constraints that no government deviates from the policy agreement. The motivations for this
approach are as follows. First, in practice, enforcement may pose a critical problem for an
international agreement. Since WTO has no real enforcement power of its own, it relies on the
independent retaliations of its members to ensure that the WTO rules are followed. Second, it is
hard to restrict each government's sovereignty over its domestic policy choices. A policy
agreement may not be realized unless it is in the benefit of member governments to continue to
cooperate over policy choices. Third, by constructing the self-enforcing equilibria, our analysis
abstracts from the assumption that a third party is able to assess and verify the trade effects of and
motivations for privately-informed governments' domestic policies.2
The paper's first main finding is that if a trade agreement motivates the high-cost government
to use domestic policies as disguised protection, then the agreement will always be improved
upon by another incentive-compatible agreement that eliminates the high-cost government's
disguised protection by allowing it to raise its tariff. Thus, the high-cost government never uses
domestic policies as disguised protection in an optimal agreement. This finding broadly implies
that trade agreements should include cooperation over domestic policies such as environmental
and labor standards, so as to reduce the inefficiency that would otherwise persist due to
subsequent disguised protections.3
1 This interpretation of terms-of-trade effects follows Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2002).
2 Due to the difficulty of assessing the trade effects, legal proceedings such as non-violation complaints may not be
easy to carry out. The number of non-violation complaints actually brought is small in practice. From 1947 through 1995
only 14 out of the more than 250 Article XXIII proceedings have centered on such complaints (Petersmann, 1997).
3 This finding thus provides a justification of the recent increasing demand for the WTO to more fully address domestic
policies such as environmental and labor standards.
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To see how this result obtains, suppose that the high-cost government initially distorts its
domestic policy under free trade. If it can choose any policy mix, as long as the world price is
unaffected (the trading partner's welfare is unaffected), then the best choice would be to raise the
tariff and eliminate domestic distortion, since tariff is the best instrument to internalize terms-of-
trade effects.4 In other words, if the high-cost government sets a positive tariff (alongside the
Pigouvian tax) such that its trading partner is indifferent, then it will be better off departing from
domestic distortion. Further, if the high-cost government sets its tariff so as to be indifferent, then
(i) its trading partner will be better off, and (ii) incentive compatibility will be provided by the
single crossing property: the low-cost government will not switch to the policies that are
indifferent to the high-cost government, and the high-cost government will not choose the low-
cost government's policies that are not preferred.
The paper next examines whether governments allow domestic distortions in the low-cost
country so as to prevent domestic distortions in the high-cost country with a reduced tariff. The
second main finding is that some domestic distortions in the low-cost country may be allowable to
accommodate a tariff reduction in the high-cost country only if the probability of such domestic
distortions being realized is sufficiently low. Domestic distortions are never commonly realized in an
optimal agreement, since governments could otherwise be better off eliminating domestic distortions
with positive tariffs in the high-cost country. This finding has two broad policy implications. First, if
domestic distortions are frequently realized perhaps by countries that face strong import competition,
it might be more desirable to permit tariff schedules to be conditional on domestic policies than to
induce frequent disguised protections such as lax environmental standards under uniform tariff
reductions.5 Second, to this end, the WTO rules need a modification to accommodate the tariff
flexibility that is conditional on domestic policies. AsWTO rules stand now, a country that truthfully
raises its domestic tax or environmental standard would not be allowed to raise its tariff.6
Lastly, this paper shows that free trade (where tariffs are uniformly zero) can be achieved only
at the expense of domestic distortions in the low-cost country, which may be too high. In a wide
range of parameters, free trade is improved upon by another agreement that reduces domestic
policies in the low-cost country by allowing positive tariffs in a high-cost country. This non-
optimality of free trade thus supports the previous finding that it might be welfare-enhancing to
permit tariffs to be conditional on domestic policies.
Despite the mounting interest in the relationship between tariff reductions and unilateral
domestic policies and the contentious issues of this relationship, no analytical papers have
investigated how privately-informed governments cooperate over two policy instruments when
they are tempted to use one of them as disguised protection.7 Taking different approaches, Bagwell
and Staiger (2001) and Ederington (2001) examine the interaction between tariff reductions and
the choice of domestic policies.
4 This “targetting principle” is observed in Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and Johnson (1965): the optimal
intervention is to use the policy that offsets the source of the distortion.
5 Interestingly, allowing a tariff increase has been supported by the advocates of anti-free trade in a different context:
countries with stringent environmental regulation should be allowed to “level the playing field” by introducing a tariff to
at least partially offset the effects of high environmental standard.
6 A similar suggestion is found in Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
7 Feenstra and Lewis (1991) investigate an incentive-compatible tariff agreement when privately-informed
governments have an incentive to overstate the political pressure for protection, assuming that there is some exogenous
enforcement mechanism. In Jensen and Thursby (1990) and Riezman (1991) privately-informed governments cooperate
over a single instrument (tariffs). One of the two instruments is non-negotiable in Copeland (1990), and non-observable
in Hungerford (1991).
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Bagwell and Staiger (2001) consider a two-stage tariff negotiating game in which the
inefficiency associated with unilateral policy choices boils down to a problem with the level of
market access, not with policy mix. Bagwell and Staiger show that if market access at the
negotiated level is secured by the prospect of the non-violation complaints, then negotiations over
tariff alone can lead to a policy mix that is efficient from a worldwide perspective. This paper
departs from the work of Bagwell and Staiger as follows. First, policy agreements are self-enforced
in this paper, whereas they are exogenously enforced by WTO rules in their paper. Second, their
paper does not deal with a disguised form of protection, since it abstracts from the case of
asymmetric information. Third, governments here design an incentive-compatible policy mix,
whereas governments there negotiate over tariffs along with a market access commitment.
Ederington (2001) investigates a self-enforcing agreement in which the motivation of a nation's
every policy choice is publicly observed. He finds that if any protective measure is taken, it will
take the form of tariff as tariff levels are tailored to prevent an observable deviation from the
agreement. This paper introduces private information into a model of self-enforcing agreement;
thus, a policy agreement acts as a revelation mechanism in which hidden protective measures are
prevented. The contrast between the work by Ederington and this paper becomes apparent when
governments care sufficiently about the future (sufficiently patient). Whereas protective measures
with tariff cease to exist in his paper since no government has an incentive to deviate, they may be
necessary in this paper since governments still have an on-schedule incentive to undertax their
import-competing goods.
With the presence of private information, this paper provides a new perspective on policy
linkage. The previous literature investigates whether the enforcement power is increased by a
linked agreement that permits cross-retaliation: a deviation in any policy induces retaliation in
both policies.8 While the literature asks whether off-schedule (non-deviation) constraints are
affected by a linked agreement, this paper highlights how on-schedule (truth-telling) incentives
are provided when policy linkage is possible. In this paper, the “off-schedule linkage” that permits
cross-retaliation would not result in an increase in the enforcement power to prevent off-schedule
deviations. The intuition is that even if retaliation with tariffs creates a stronger threat to deter a
domestic-policy deviation, governments have a lower incentive to undertake a deviation using
domestic policy than one using tariff. By contrast, the “on-schedule linkage” that permits tariffs to
be conditional on domestic policies may enhance the efficiency of policy agreements.9
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic two-good, two-country
model. Section 3 defines the repeated game and finds the parameter range in which governments
under the first-best policies are tempted to undertax their import-competing goods. Section 4 argues
that there are some tariff-reduction agreements on which governments can always improve. Section
5 investigates when governments do not use domestic policies as protective measures. Section 6
discusses some possibilities of model extension. Section 7 provides conclusions.
2. The basic model
This paper considers a simple two-good, two-country partial equilibriummodel. Two countries,
home (no ⁎) and foreign (⁎), trade two goods, x and y, produced in competitive markets. Let x(y)
8 See, for example, Ederington (2002, 2003), Limão (2005), and Spagnolo (2001).
9 Ederington (2003) shows that the “non-neutrality” of cross-retaliation may result from the imperfect monitoring on
deviations: cross-retaliation may be beneficial (is detrimental) when there is the possibility that a country fails to detect
(erroneously believes) its trading partner's deviation with domestic policy. The on-schedule linkage in this paper,
however, intends to elicit countries' truthfulness rather than a stronger threat as in his paper.
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be the natural import good of the home (foreign) country. Each of the two goods is demanded in
both countries according to a symmetric demand function D. Let pi
d and pi
s denote the local prices
of good i=x,y in the domestic market. To obtain some concrete insights in later analysis, this paper
assumes that the demand and supply functions take specific linear forms:D(pi
d)=α−βpid for i=x,y,
Qx( px
s)=γpx
s, and Qy( py
s)=ϕpy
s. The foreign demand and supply functions are symmetrically
specified: D( pi⁎d)=α−βpi⁎d for i=x,y, Qx⁎( px⁎s)=ϕpx⁎s and Qy⁎( py⁎s)= γps⁎s. The associated
parameters α, β, γ and ϕ are strictly positive. Consistent with the assumption that the domestic
country is the natural importer of good x, it is assumed that Qx(p)= Qy⁎( p)bQy( p)=Qx⁎( p);
i.e., γbϕ.
This paper introduces domestic tax (subsidy) into the model by assuming that each country
incurs an external cost (benefit) when it produces the import good. This paper also assumes that
policy choices are publicly observed, whereas external costs (benefits) are privately observed by
the associated government; thus, it is non-verifiable whether a reduction of domestic tax (increase
of subsidy) is intended to internalize external impacts, or to offer additional protection to the
import good. Following Ederington (2002), this paper assumes that external impacts take
linear forms: θQx( px
s) and θ⁎Qy⁎ ( py⁎s). In each period, the marginal impacts, θ and θ⁎, are
independently drawn from the identical common-knowledge distribution with discrete support
{θL, θH}, where θLbθH and probability of θj is μj, j∈{L,H}. Each of θ and θ⁎ thus acts as a
country's privately-observed “type”.
Let t and τ denote, respectively, the (specific) production tax and the tariff that the home
country imposes on good x. Let t⁎ and τ⁎ denote the analogous policies that the foreign country
imposes on good y. Suppose also that px
w and py
w denote the world (offshore) prices of goods x
and y. The domestic consumer and producer prices of import good x are defined as px
d≡pxw+τ,
px
s≡pxw− t+τ, where pxw=px⁎d=px⁎s. Likewise, the foreign consumer and producer prices of
import good y are defined as py⁎d≡pyw+τ⁎, py⁎s≡pyw− t⁎+τ⁎, where pyw=pyd=pys. If the trade and
domestic policies do not prohibit all trade, then world and local prices must satisfy the market-
clearing condition:
Qiðpsi Þ þ Q⁎i ðp⁎si Þ ¼ Dð pdi Þ þ dðpi⁎dÞ; i ¼ x; y: ð1Þ
The market-clearing world prices are then
pwx t; sð Þ ¼
2aþ gt−ðbþ gÞs
/þ gþ 2b and p
w
y t
⁎; s⁎ð Þ ¼ 2aþ gt
⁎−ðbþ gÞs⁎
/þ gþ 2b :
The market-clearing local prices of import goods, pˆx
d, pˆx
s, pˆy⁎d and pˆy⁎s are similarly obtained.
Note that each government can reduce the world price of its import good by raising the tariff or
reducing the domestic tax. To deal with the parameter range in which (i) trade volumes are non-
negative under Nash policies and (ii) each country produces the import-competing good under
free trade, it is assumed that θ is in the range:
−
að/−gÞ
gð/þ bÞVhbmin
/þ 2gþ 3b
g
−
að/−gÞ
gð/þ bÞ ;
2a
/þ 2b
 
Trade occurs as long as the positive externality in the import-competing industry is not too
large. The import good is produced as long as the negative externality is not too large.
Define next domestic consumer and producer surpluses as CSið pˆdi Þu
R a=b
pˆdi
Dð piÞdpi and
Pið pˆsi Þu
R pˆsi
0 Qið piÞdpi for i=x, y. Define also pˆx≡ ( pˆxd, pˆxs) and pˆy⁎≡ ( pˆy⁎d, pˆx⁎s) This section
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describes the interim-stage game where the domestic government observes θ=θj, and the foreign
government observes θ⁎=θk. Given that the associated policy choices are (t= tj, τ=τj) and (t⁎= tk,
τ⁎=τk), the domestic country's welfare from good x and good y is
Wxð pˆx; pwx ÞuCSxð pˆdx Þ þPxð pˆsxÞ þ ½ pˆdx− pˆwx Mxð pˆxÞ þ ½ pˆdx− pˆsx−hjQxð pˆsxÞ;
Wyðpwy ÞuCSyðpwx Þ þPyðpwy Þ;
where pˆx= pˆx(t= tj, τ=τj), px
w=px
w(t= tj, τ=τj), and py
w=py
w(t⁎= tk, τ⁎=τk). Thus the interim-stage
welfare function is
W ð pˆx; pwx ; pwy ÞuWxð pˆx; pwx Þ þ
X
kafL;Hg
lkWyðpwy Þ; ð2Þ
where probability is weighted over good y since py
w is unknown and conditional on the trading
partner's type. Likewise, the foreign government has the interim-stage welfare functionW⁎( pˆx⁎, px
w,
py
w).
“Nash policies” of the domestic country (denoted by τj
N and tj
N) satisfy the first-order
conditions of Eq. (2) with respect to τ and t: for j∈{L,H},
ðbþ gÞMxð pˆxÞ−ðbþ /Þðbþ gÞsj þ gðbþ /Þðtj−hjÞ ¼ 0; ð3Þ
−gMxð pˆxÞ þ gðbþ /Þsj−gð2bþ /Þðtj−hjÞ ¼ 0: ð4Þ
Nash policies for the foreign country are similarly obtained.10 The first term on the LHS of Eq. (3)
(multiplied by 1/(ϕ+γ+2β )) corresponds to Wpxw(∂px
w/∂τ). It captures the change in the welfare of
the domestic government caused by the impact of a slight increase of tariff on the world price, with
the local prices being held constant. This is the terms-of-trade effect, which reflects a redistribution of
surplus from foreign exporters to the domestic country. A slight rise in the import tariff increases the
tariff revenue collected onMx( pˆx) units of import good as a result of lowering the world price.
11 In
Nash policies, governments unilaterally raise tariffs to achieve terms-of-trade effects, with no
domestic distortions.
In the first-best policies, however, no country manipulates terms of trade. With local prices being
held constant, a change in world prices results in a simple redistribution of income across countries.
Indeed, the first-best policies are obtained by eliminating the terms for terms-of-trade effect in Eqs.
(3) and (4).12 Our analysis thus obtains a standard result in the context of a private information
model.
10 Note that the second-order conditions are satisfied: d2W(·) is negative definite.
11 When multiplied by 1/(ϕ+γ+2b), the second term is τ(∂Mx/∂τ) that captures the efficiency cost incurred when a
tariff increase induces the import reduction, while the third term is (tj−θj)Qx' (pˆxs)(∂pˆxs/∂τ) that captures the net effect on
tax revenue and external cost when a tariff increase raises the producer price. Eq. (4) is similarly interpreted.
12 It can be shown that the second-order condition is satisfied.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that a country observes θj, j∈ {L,H}. (i) There exists a unique Bayesian–
Nash equilibrium in which
tj ¼ hj and sj ¼ að/−gÞ þ gðbþ /Þhjðbþ /Þð/þ 2gþ 3bÞ :
(ii) The first-best policy choices are tj=θj and τj=0.
3. Repeated games with incentive to undertax
In the stage game, each government learns only its own type and then chooses domestic tax
and tariff. The per-period state space is Ω≡Θ×Θ⁎, where Θ={θL, θH} and Θ⁎={θL,θH}. The
symmetric strategy sets in the stage game are S ¼ ftjt : HYRg  fsjs : HYRg and
S⁎ ¼ ft⁎jt⁎ : H⁎YRg  fs⁎js⁎ : H⁎YRg. The domestic country's stage-game payoff is
W : S  S⁎ Y R, and its expected stage-game payoff is W¯ (s)=Eθ˜ [W(s(θ), s⁎(θ⁎); θ)], where
s=(s, s⁎) and θ˜≡ (θ, θ⁎).13 This stage game is infinitely repeated. Entering a period, each
government publicly observes the history of realized policy choices but privately observes the
history of its own type and the associated policy functions. Attention here is restricted to Perfect
Public Equilibrium, where governments' choices at date n may be based on private information
from date n, but only on public information (realized policy choices) from date n′bn (Fudenberg
et al., 1994).
To be implementable as an equilibrium play, the policy choices must satisfy (i) the on-schedule
constraints that each government truthfully choose the policies assigned to its type and (ii) the
offschedule constraints that each government cannot gain by choosing a policy mix that is not
assigned to any cost type. Our analysis hereafter is based on the following assumptions: (i) any
off-schedule deviation by a country leads to infinite Nash reversion, and (ii) governments do not
use any form of direct monetary payments: side-payments, and negative tariffs or export policies
as a channel of direct monetary payments. State (θj,θk)∈Ω is indexed as ( j, k). Welfare functions
are now written in terms of policy choices: in state ( j, k), the domestic government achieves Wx
(t= tj, τ=τj; θj) from import good x and Wy(t⁎= tk, τ⁎=τk) from export good y, and the foreign
government attains Wy⁎(t⁎= tk, τ⁎=τk; θk) from import good y and Wx⁎(t= tj, τ=τj) from export
good x.
In the model, the efficiency that is enhanced by tariff reduction can be subsequently eroded by
protection in the form of domestic policies. A unilateral reduction of domestic tax decreases the
world price. At the same time, it increases the domestic producer price and decreases the domestic
consumer price. This causes a redistribution of surplus from foreign exporters to its domestic
consumers and producers, with some implied efficiency costs. If the domestic government,
observing θH, sets its tax at θL under free trade, then it gains
Wxðt ¼ hL; s ¼ 0; hH Þ−Wxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ 0; hH Þ
¼
Z pˆdx ðt¼hL;s¼0Þ
pˆdx ðt¼hH ;s¼0Þ
DðpxÞdpx þ
Z pˆsxðt¼hL;s¼0Þ
pˆsxðt¼hH ;s¼0Þ
QxðpxÞdpx−ðhH−hLÞQxðt ¼ hL; s ¼ 0Þ:
ð5Þ
13 The expected stage-game payoff for the foreign country is analogous.
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As the level of θL decreases for a given θH, the first two terms in Eq. (5) dominate at the
beginning, but later the last term for the efficiency costs dominates. Thus, for a given θH, there
exists a lower bound of θL (denoted by S L):
S L ¼ S L hHð Þu ðbþ ð/þ 2bÞ
2ÞhH
g
−
2að/−gÞ
gg
;
where η≡ ( β+ϕ)+ (ϕ+2β) (1+ϕ+2β ). The locus S L= S L(θH) is seen in Fig. 1. Area ABC is
defined as UT≡{(θH,θL):θLb S L(θH)}, and area ADC is defined as FB≡{(θH,θL):θL≤ S L(θH)}. In
area UT, the first-best policy choices are not incentive compatible. In area FB, sufficiently patient
governments can attain the first-best welfare. This paper hereafter restricts attention to parameter
area UT.
Assumption 1. Wx(t=θL, τ=0;θH)−Wx(t=θH,τ=0;θH)N0.
4. Non-optimalities of uniform tariff reductions
The main findings are presented here and in the next section. In this section, we find that a
uniform tariff reduction is not desirable if it induces the high-cost government to use disguised
protection in the form of domestic policies.
Lemma 1. Given a government's policy mix ((tL, τL ),(tH, τH )), where tHbθH and τL=τH=0,
(i) there exists a policy mix ((tL,τL ), (tH′ ≡θH ,τH′ )) , under which the government is better off while
its trading partner is indifferent, and (ii) there exists another policy mix ((tL, τL ), (tHʺ ≡θH , τHʺ )),
under which the government is indifferent while its trading partner is better off.
Fig. 1. Areas of UT and FB.
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The proof is in the Appendix. The alternative policy mixes (tH′ , τH′ ) and (tHʺ , τHʺ ) are illustrated
in Fig. 2, wherein the world price is held constant along the line p¯x
w. The initial policy pair causes a
domestic distortion under free trade. If the high-cost government can choose any policy mix, as
long as the world price is unaffected (the trading partner's welfare is unaffected), then it will
achieve the terms-of-trade effects by raising the tariff (τH′ N0), with no domestic distortion. If the
high-cost (home) government is better off switching its policy mix to (tH′ , τH′ ), then there exists a
lower tariff τHʺ bτH′ such that for (tHʺ , τHʺ ), the home government is indifferent and the foreign
government is better off. Assuming the same notation, we extend the second result in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Assume that both governments are assigned to the same policy mix. If the initial free-
trade policy mix in Lemma 1, ((tL,τL ), (tH,τH )), is incentive compatible, then the alternative policy
mix ((tL,τL ), (tHʺ ,τHʺ )) is also incentive compatible.
A sketch of the proof. Incentive compatibility of the initial policy mix ((tL, 0), (tH, 0)) implies that
Wxðt ¼ tL; s ¼ 0; hLÞzWxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0; hH Þ ðon IC0LÞ
Wxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0; hH ÞzWxðt ¼ tL; s ¼ 0; hH Þ ðon IC0HÞ
and that for the common discount factor δ,
d
1−d
W¯
0−W¯N
 
zmax DL;DHf g; ðoff  IC0Þ
where W¯ 0 and W¯ N denote the per-period expected welfare under the initial and Nash policies, and
where
DjuWxðt ¼ hj; s ¼ sNj ; hjÞ−Wxðt ¼ tj; s ¼ 0; hjÞ; j ¼ L;H :
Fig. 2. Alternative policies.
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The RHS of off-IC0 represents the immediate gain from an off-schedule deviation, and the
LHS represents the long-term loss that follows the deviation. Letting δ0 be the critical discount
factor above which off-IC0 is satisfied, the home government is sufficiently patient such that
δNδ0.
It now suffices to show that the alternative policy mix ((tL, 0), (θH, τHʺ )) satisfies both on-and
off-schedule constraints, for all δNδ0. The associated on-schedule constraints are
Wxðt ¼ tL; s ¼ 0; hLÞzWxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ; hLÞ; ðon ICʺLÞ
Wxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ; hHÞzWxðt ¼ tL; s ¼ 0; hHÞ: ðon ICʺHÞ
The second constraint is immediate: the high-cost government is indifferent between (θH, τH″ )
and (tH, 0) from Lemma 1, and prefers (tH, 0) to (tL, 0) from on-ICH
0 . The first constraint is slack,
due to the single crossing property: the low-cost government needs a higher τ for a given rise in t
so as to be indifferent, since it suffers a higher efficiency cost than the high-cost government.14
Thus, when the high-cost government is indifferent between (tH, 0) and (θH, τH″ ), the low-cost
government prefers (tH, 0) to (θH, τH″ ):
Wxðt ¼ tL; s ¼ 0; hLÞzWxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0; hLÞNWxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ; hLÞ;
where the first inequality is on-ICL
0. The off-schedule constraint under the alternative policy mix is
d
1−d
W¯ W−W¯N
 
zmax DL;DHWf g; ðoff  ICʺÞ
where W¯ ʺ denotes the per-period welfare of the home government, and where
DHWuWxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sNH ; hHÞ−Wxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ; hH Þ:
The second result of Lemma 1 implies that if the foreign government is assigned to ((tL, τL),
(θH, τHʺ )), the home government is better off: W¯ ʺNW¯
0. As compared to off-IC0, the RHS of off-
ICʺ is the same, but the LHS is greater. Hence, the alternative policy mix satisfies both on-and off-
schedule constraints for all δNδ0Nδʺ. □
We next build on Lemma 1 and 2 to establish some non-optimal agreements. This paper says
that an agreement is not optimal if it is always improved upon by another incentive-compatible
agreement.
Consider first an agreement on the optimal pooling policies: tL= tH=E(θ) and τL=τH=0.
15
This agreement is easy to enforce since any deviation would be duly detected. The pooling
policies are not optimal since the high-cost government there distorts domestic policies. By the
same token, separating domestic policies (tL≠ tH) along with free trade are not optimal when the
high-cost government distorts domestic policies.
Lemma 3. Free trade under which the high-cost government distorts its domestic policy is not
optimal.
The proof for Lemma 3 is immediate: for free trade to be incentive compatible, domestic
policies must be either pooling or separating, but neither pooling nor separating of domestic
14 The proof for this part is detailed in the Appendix.
15 Pooling at E(θ) minimizes the expected efficiency cost under free trade, when the externality enters linearly in the
welfare functions.
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policies is optimal when tH≠θH .16 Indeed, this result holds for all sufficiently low tariffs at which
the high-cost government is motivated to undertax its import good.
Proposition 2. If a trade agreement motivates the high-cost government to use domestic policies
as disguised protection, then the agreement will always be improved upon by another incentive-
compatible agreement that eliminates the high-cost government's disguised protection by
permitting it to raise its tariff.
It becomes clear that the high-cost government never uses domestic policies as disguised
protection in an optimal agreement (i.e., tH=θH in an optimal agreement). This finding broadly
implies that trade agreements should include cooperation over domestic policies, so as to reduce
the inefficiency that would otherwise persist due to subsequent disguised protections. It also
implies that free trade (or a uniform tariff reduction) may be optimal only if the agreement on free
trade assigns the low-cost government to a sufficiently low tL so that the high-cost government
has no incentive to distort its domestic policy. Free trade is thus achieved only at the expense of
domestic distortions in the low-cost country (tLbθL), which may be too high. The following result
shows that free trade may be optimal only in quite a limited parameter range.
Corollary 1. (i) Free trade is optimal if and only if free trade with tL= S L and tH=θH is optimal.
(ii) There exists a range of the gap θH−θL in which free trade is not optimal; τHN0 in an optimal
agreement.
The first result follows directly from the previous analysis. Free trade is optimal if and only if
free trade along with tH=θH is optimal. The high-cost government is induced to choose tH=θH
only when tL≤ S L. The second result shows that domestic inefficiency in the low-cost country
becomes too large when the gap θL− S L is sufficiently large (θH−θL is sufficiently small). The
range of θH−θL in which this occurs is illustrated by area ABC′ in Fig. 1.
5. Optimalities of conditional tariff schedules
This section investigates when domestic distortions are never used as protective measures in an
optimal agreement. Put differently, it asks when the targeting principle, in the sense of Bhagwati
and Ramaswami (1963) and Johnson (1965), holds in the presence of private information. To this
end, suppose that (tj, τj) and (tk, τk) are agreed on in state ( j, k). The ex post joint welfare, realized
in state ( j, k), is then
xjkuWxðt ¼ tj; s ¼ sj; hjÞ þWyðt⁎ ¼ tk ; s⁎ ¼ skÞ þW⁎x ðt ¼ tj; s ¼ sjÞ
þW⁎y ðt⁎ ¼ tk ; s⁎ ¼ sk ; hkÞ;
and the ex ante expected joint welfare is
x¯u
X
jafL;Hg
X
kafL;Hg
ljlkxjk :
Due to the symmetry of the model, it can be shown that ωLH+ωHL=ωLL+ωHH. This reduces
the expected joint welfare to ω¯=μLωLL+μHωHH.
To simplify the exposition, assume that governments are sufficiently patient. Note, first, that a
policy mix optimally achieves domestic efficiencies if (tL, τL)= (θL, 0) and (tH, τH)= (θH, τˆH),
16 If tHNθH under free trade, then both high- and low-cost governments can always reduce domestic distortions by
setting tH=θH.
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where a positive tariff τˆHN0 is defined such that on-ICH is binding: Wx(t=θH,τ= τˆH; θH)=Wx
(t=θL, τ=0; θH). This policy mix is denoted as DE policies and illustrated in Fig. 3.
17 Note,
second, that τL=0 in an optimal agreement: setting τLN0 induces the high-cost government to be
more tempted to mimic a low-cost country, and thus increases inefficiencies not only in (L, L) but
also in (H, H). Note, third, that tH=θH in an optimal agreement by Proposition 2.
Therefore, the design of optimal policy agreement faces a trade-off between domestic
efficiency in the low-cost country and tariff efficiency in the high-cost country. DE policies
achieve domestic efficiency in the low-cost country but allow tariff inefficiency in the high-cost
country. Any alternative to DE policies allows domestic inefficiency in the low-cost country, but
with a reduced tariff in the high-cost country. A typical alternative is the optimal free trade with
tL= S L and tH=θH. Here again, the targeting principle is exploited: given the issue of terms-of-
trade externality, only the efficient instrument (trade policy) is used in DE policies, whereas the
inefficient instrument (domestic policy) also is used in alternative policies. Ignoring the pro-
bability weights, this argument obtains
xDELL þ xDEHH NxLLV þ xHHV :
The values ωjj
DE and ωjj′ are the ex post joint welfare attained from DE policies and any
alternative policies (tj′,τj′), j∈{L,H}. Each of the values varies with the gap θH−θL and other
parameters, but the inequality remains.18 To compare DE policies to any alternative, define the
ratio of the welfare gain in (L, L) to the welfare loss in (H, H) as follows:
jVu
xDELL −xLLV
xHHV −xDEHH
N1:
Fig. 3. Free trade and DE policies.
17 In Fig. 3, Wx
DE(t,τ;θH) is asymmetrically shifted up from Wx
FT(t,τ;θH). The intuition for this is that under free trade, a
reduction (rise) in t has a terms-of-trade gain (loss), and thus the rise in t (from S L) must be greater than the reduction in
t (from θH ), so as to stay in the same welfare by reducing the domestic inefficiency.
18 This inequality is reinforced by the asymmetric shifting up of Wx
DE(t,τ;θH).
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The analysis of comparing two policy agreements is simply that ω¯DEN ω¯′ if and only if μLN1 /
(κ′+1).
Proposition 3. (i) If governments are sufficiently patient and if there is a policy mix (t′j, τ′j ),
j∈ {L, H}, such that μL≤1 / (κ′+1) b1/2, then there are domestic distortions in an optimal
agreement: tL≠θL and tH=θH. (ii) Otherwise, there is no domestic distortion in an optimal
agreement: tL=θL and tH=θH together with τHN0.
The second part of Proposition 3 holds for all δ. That is because when δ is low enough, domestic
efficiencies are achieved in Nash policies. Some domestic distortions in the low-country may be
allowed to accommodate a tariff reduction in the high-cost country only if the probability of such
domestic distortions being realized is sufficiently low: domestic distortions are never commonly
realized in an optimal agreement, since governments could otherwise be better off eliminating
domestic distortions with positive tariffs in the high-cost country. There are two broad policy
implications in this finding. First, if domestic distortions are frequently realized perhaps by countries
that face strong import competition, it might be more desirable to permit tariff schedules to be
conditional on domestic policies than to induce frequent disguised protections such as lax envi-
ronmental standards under uniform tariff reductions. Second, to this end, WTO rules need a
modification so that tariffs can be conditional on domestic policies. Under current WTO rules, a
country that truthfully raises its domestic tax or environmental standardwould not be allowed to raise
its tariff.
Along with Corollary 1, this finding also implies that free trade is optimal only under rather
limited conditions: the gap θH−θL is sufficiently large (S L−θL is sufficiently small) and μL is
sufficiently small such that μLb1 / (κ
FT+1), where κFT≡ (ωLL′ −ωLLFT) / (ωHHFT −ωHH′ ) and when ωjj′
is attained from the best non-free trade policies whereas ωjj
FT is attained under free trade.
This section lastly argues that the non-optimality of free trade that holds in a wide range of
parameters is in support of the on-schedule policy linkage that permits tariffs to be conditional on
domestic policies. If free trade (where tariffs are uniformly zero) is optimal, the on-schedule linkage
is welfare-neutral. If free trade is not optimal, however, it is welfare-improving. When free trade is
not optimal, then τL=0 and τHN0 in an optimal agreement for high δ, and τHNτLN0 in Nash
policies for low δ; thus, tariffs are conditional on domestic policies in an optimal agreement for all δ.
Proposition 4. (i) If governments are sufficiently patient and if free trade is optimal, then it is
welfare-neutral to permit tariffs to be conditional on domestic policies. (ii) Otherwise, it is
welfare-improving to permit tariffs to be conditional on domestic policies.
6. Some extensions
This section discusses three possibilities of extending the model.19 The first possibility of
extension is a continuous-type model in which θ is drawn from the support [θ
¯
, θ¯ ] according to the
commonly known distribution function F(θ). The associated policy schedules for each type θ are
denoted (t(θ), τ (θ)) and (t⁎(θ), τ⁎(θ)). The first-best policies, t(θ)= t⁎(θ)=θ and τ (θ)=τ⁎(θ)=0
for all θ, are never incentive compatible, since governments above θ
¯
can always make a tax
reduction without triggering a punishment under the policies.20
19 The first two extensions seen in this section are motivated by the referees' reports.
20 In the continuous-type model, governments under the first-best policies can make a slight tax reduction to disguise
their cheating. In the two-type model, however, the high-cost government under the first-best policies must make a
substantial tax reduction to disguise its cheating; the government thus has an incentive to undertax only when θL is not
too far away from θH as in Assumption 1.
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Suppose that governments are sufficiently patient. Using a similar logic as above, we can show
that t(θ¯)= t⁎(θ¯)= θ¯ in an optimal agreement. Assume to the contrary that the domestic government
at its highest cost θ¯ is assigned to an incentive-compatible policy mix (t(θ¯), τ(θ¯)), where t(θ¯)b θ¯.
Then consider a tariff schedule τ=τ (θ¯)+ [γ / (β+γ)][t− t(θ¯)] that increases with t and maintains
the world price px
w along the associated policy-mix line segment. The government at the highest
cost θ¯ prefers to choose policies from the policy-mix line segment than to stay with (t(θ¯), τ(θ¯)). In
fact, there exists a range [θ¯−c, θ¯] for cN0 such that the government in the range prefers to choose
policies from the line segment than to stay with the initial policies. 21 Thus, the government can
increase its expected welfare without damaging its trading partner's welfare, which is a
contradiction. Hence, t(θ¯)= θ¯ in an optimal agreement.
This result implies that free trade at the best pooling, (t(θ), τ (θ))= (E(θ), 0) for all θ, is not
optimal since t(θ¯)=E(θ)b θ¯. Free trade is optimal only if free trade along with t(θ¯)= θ¯ is optimal.
Let S
¯
denote the lower bound of the tax levels that the type-θ¯ government under (t(θ¯), τ (θ¯))= (θ¯,
0) has an incentive to choose. The notation S
¯
corresponds to S L in the two-type model. The type-θ¯
government is induced to choose t(θ¯)= θ¯ under free trade only when t(θ˜)≤ S
¯
for all θ˜b θ¯.
Therefore, free trade (a uniform tariff reduction) is achieved only at the substantial expense of
domestic distortions below θ¯, which may be too high.22 The counterpart of free trade would be
the conditional tariff schedule τ=[γ / (β+γ)][t− θ
¯
] that eliminates domestic distortions for all
types. This policy schedule also has a weakness: it allows positive tariffs for all types regardless of
the shape of the distribution function F. The model thus poses various possibilities of allowing
domestic distortions. Domestic distortions are, however, never commonly realized below a
certain level of tax t˜ in an optimal agreement, since governments could otherwise be better off
adopting a conditional tariff schedule for some types located between t˜ and θ¯.
The second possibility of extension is a lobbying model that accommodates a political-
economy externality by placing a weight on producer surplus. An important assumption is that
domestic political pressure changes over time for various political reasons and only the domestic
government knows the weight. Let λx≥1 (λy≥1) denote the weight that the government places
on the producer surplus earned by import-competing (exporting) firms. Ignoring the state-
dependent subscripts seen in the previous model, the first-order conditions for the government
with respect to τ and t are
ðbþ gÞMxð pˆxÞ−ðbþ /Þðbþ gÞsþ gðbþ /Þðt−hÞ þ ðkx−1Þðbþ /ÞQxð pˆsxÞ ¼ 0;
−gMxð pˆxÞ þ gðbþ /Þs−gð2bþ /Þðt−hÞ−ðkx−1Þð2bþ /ÞQxð pˆsxÞ ¼ 0:
The last term in each equation is new and captures a political-economy effect.23 Trade volumes
are positive for positive Nash tariffs and the import-competing goods are produced under zero
tariffs if
kxb2þmin g2bþ / ;
g½hðbþ /Þ−a
a/
 
and hb
2a
2bþ / :
21 Note that for the government at the highest cost θ¯, the initial policy mix (t(θ¯), τ (θ¯)) was at least as preferable as any
other initial policy mix. For the government in the range [θ¯ −c,θ¯), its initial policy mix was at least as preferable as (t(θ¯),
τ (θ¯)).
22 Free trade may be optimal with a very stringent assumption that the distribution function F has a mass point at θ¯ such
that types below θ¯ are rarely realized.
23 The last terms represent the impact of a slight policy change on the producer surplus that has an extra political weight.
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Given this parameter range and the multiple sources of private information, Bayesian–Nash
policy choices for the home country, tN(θ,λx) and τ
N(θ,λx), satisfy
t ¼ h− kx−1ð ÞQxð pˆ
s
xÞ
g
and s ¼ Mxð pˆxÞ
bþ / :
To show that the government has an incentive to undertax subsequent to a tariff reduction, let
tPE(θ,λx;τ) denote the “political-economy tax” that satisfies the first equation for a given τ.
24
Lemma 4. (i) tPE(θ,λx;τ) increases with θ and decreases with λx. (ii) The domestic welfare
function has the slope dτ/dt=γ / (β+γ) at a point (t, τ) if and only if t= tPE(θ,λx;τ).
The proof is in the Appendix. The first result implies that when tariffs are uniformly zero, the
political-economy tax tPE(θ,λx;τ=0) is lower when production externality is lower or when
political pressure is higher. The second result has two implications. First, the government under
free trade can achieve terms-of-trade gains and increase its welfare by lowering its domestic tax
below tPE(θ,λx;τ=0).
25 Second, if the government is induced to choose any policy mix (t, τ)
along a line segment that has the slope dτ/dt=γ / (β+γ), then it will truthfully choose t= tPE(θ,λx;
τ) without affecting its trading partner's welfare. Our main finding can be summarized as follows.
Assume that domestic political pressure is rather unstable over time and arbitrarily overstated and
that tax reductions below tPE(θ,λx;τ) are commonly observed subsequent to a tariff-reduction
agreement. Then it might be more preferable to adopt a conditional tariff schedule than to induce
frequent disguised protections under a uniform tariff reduction.
The third possibility of extension is a sophisticated modification in which tariff schedules are
conditional on “intertemporal scorekeeping.” In this agreement, if the high-cost government
truthfully chooses a high tax, then it receives a future reward when its trading partner sets a low
tax.26 This future reward will be realized when the high-cost government is permitted to raise its
tariff to τˆ tomorrow. If it lies and chooses a low tax, then it suffers a future loss (on-schedule
punishment) when its trading partner sets a high tax. This future loss will be realized when its
trading partner is permitted to raise its tariff to τˆ tomorrow. The level of τˆ is determined such that
the expected (discounted) sum of future reward and future loss is greater than the high-cost
governments' gain from undertaxing in the current period. For a given τˆ , the associated future
punishment is greater than the future reward since a tariff increase by the home government
suffers from some inefficiency (welfare loss).
If μH is high, then a truthful high-cost government will receive the future gain with a
small probability of its trading partner drawing low cost, but an untruthful high-cost
government will suffer a “large” future punishment with a high probability of its trading
partner drawing high cost. Indeed, if positive tariffs are ever used to achieve incentive
compatibility and if μH is high enough, then sufficiently patient governments prefer to
condition tariffs on the preceding-period states than on current-period states.27 If μH is high,
26 Related ideas are found in Atkeson and Lucas (1992), who explore the efficient consumption allocation to privately
informed consumers, and in Athey and Bagwell (2001), who explore the efficient allocation of market to privately
informed firms.
27 My working paper (Lee, 2005) formally details this argument by using the dynamic programming tools.
24 Given the parameter range, the second-order conditions are satisfied. In Nash policies, the domestic government uses
higher protective measures (lower t N and higher τ N ) when the political weight λx is larger.
25 Our analysis focuses on the political-economy tax. It can be shown that the first-best tax tFB also suffers from the
same incentive problem as above. The distinct feature of t FB is that it additionally considers the positive effect of raising
tax on the profit of foreign exporting firms under free trade (i.e., t FB= t FB(θ,λx,λy⁎)).
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then (i) the harshness of on-schedule punishment is mitigated since the value τˆ is low, and (ii)
the frequency of on-schedule punishments is reduced. In state (H, H), as is often observed,
punishments occur neither today nor tomorrow. In state (H, L) or (L, H), inefficiencies are
avoided today but punishments will occur tomorrow with probability of 1 (regardless of
states). If tariffs are conditional on the current-period states, then for a large μH, such
inefficiencies are very likely to occur both today and tomorrow. If μH is high enough, then the
intertemporal scorekeeping enhances the efficiency of using positive tariffs to achieve
incentive compatibility, and thus reduces the possibility that free trade is optimal for a
sufficiently low μL.
7. Conclusions
This paper has examined how governments cooperate over trade and domestic policies when
the sole externalities across countries are terms-of-trade motivations. The main findings can be
summarized as follows. First, the high-cost government never uses domestic policies as
disguised protection in an optimal agreement. Second, disguised protections with domestic
policies are never commonly realized in an optimal agreement, since governments could
otherwise be better off eliminating disguised protections with positive tariffs. Third, free trade
(or a uniform tariff reduction) can be achieved only at the expense of domestic distortions, which
may be too high in a wide range of parameters.
Descriptive accounts of domestic-policy-driven protectionism in the literature seem to differ
quite markedly. While Ederington (2001) and Bagwell and Staiger (2001) in their theoretical
models predict that domestic policies are not used as protective measures in equilibrium,
Trebilcock and Howse (1999) report comprehensive cases where environmental regulations are
used as protective measures. Ederington and Minier (2003) find empirical support for the
strategic use of environmental regulations, reporting that environmental policy, as an endogenous
variable, has a much stronger impact on net import levels than was previously reported.
Ederington and Minier also argue that the U.S. tends to undertax import-competing industries
and overtax export industries. Copeland (1990) shows that when tariff is the negotiable
instrument, there will be substitution toward the inefficient instrument of protection in
equilibrium. In this paper, we find that domestic distortions may be explicitly allowable to
prevent “hidden protections” with domestic policies only if domestic distortions are infrequently
used. If domestic distortions are commonly realized, then it would be welfare-improving for a
trade agreement to include cooperation over domestic policies by letting tariffs be conditional on
domestic policies.
This paper is the first to investigate a self-enforcing policy agreement when privately-
informed governments are able to disguise the provision of protection to their import goods by
using domestic policies. In practice, our approach has some limitations and presents some
challenges for future research. First, our findings are based on a simple two-good, one-
externality model. In practice, however, there are various instruments of disguised protection
since countries have multiple sources of private information. Thus, it would be very costly to
accurately assess the trade effects of domestic policies and implement the resulting complicated
policies. As a result, the efficiencies enhanced by broadening trade agreements would be
compromised by the increased “transactional costs.” Second, broadening trade agreements
raises a difficult and yet important question: how can national sovereignty over domestic
policies be reconciled with international agreements on trade policy in the presence of disguised
protectionism?
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) For a given policy mix (tH, 0), define a set
fðtHV; sHVÞ : pwx ðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0Þ ¼ pwx ðt ¼ tHV; s ¼ sHVÞg:
Note that px
w(t= tH, τ=0)=px
w(t= tH′ , τ=τH′ ) if and only if τH′ =[γ / (β+γ)] (tH′ − tH). If the world
price remains the same, then the foreign-government welfare also remains unaffected, since it is
affected by changes in the home-government policies, only through movement of the world price
px
w. Plug τH′ into W( pˆx,px
w,py
w), and then differentiate with respect to tH′ . It can then be shown that
AW
AtHV
¼ − tHV−hHð Þ bgbþ g :
The optimal choice for the home government is thus tH′ =θH and τH′ =[γ / (β+γ)](θH− tH) in the
defined set.
(ii) The first result shows that if the home government switches the policy mix from ((tL, 0),
(tH, 0)) to ((tL, 0), (θH, τH′ )), then it will be better off while the foreign government is indifferent.
Thus there exists a lower tariff τH″ bτH′ such that the home government is indifferent while the
foreign government is better off, under a new policy mix ((tL, 0), (θH, τH″ )). □
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof, provided in the text, will be complete if
Wxðt ¼ tL; s ¼ 0; hLÞzWxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ; hLÞ:
From on-ICL
0 in the text, it is known that the low-cost government prefers (tL, 0) to (tH, 0):
Wxðt ¼ tL; s ¼ 0; hLÞzWxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0; hLÞ:
Thus it suffices to prove
Wxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0; hLÞzWxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ; hLÞ: ðA1Þ
Note that the policy mix (θH, τH″ ) is defined such that
Wxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0; hH Þ ¼ Wxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ; hH Þ: ðA2Þ
Consider now the functionWx(t,τ;θH) that crosses those two indifferent points, (tH, 0) and (θH,
τH″ ), where tHbθH and 0bτH″ . Then, a linear function that is tangent to Wx(t,τ;θH) at (θH, τH″ )
crosses a point (t˜ , 0), where t˜ N tH. Since this linear function crosses two points, (t˜, 0) and (θH, τH″ ),
its slope is given by
sHW−0
hH− ft
¼ − AWxðt; s; hHÞ=At
AWxðt; s; hHÞ=As jt¼hH ;s¼sHW ¼ gbþ g : ðA3Þ
Rewrite the LHS of Eq. (A1) as
Wxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0; hLÞ ¼ Wxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0; hH Þ þ ðhH−hLÞQxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0Þ: ðA4Þ
Under the same policy mix (tH, 0), both low- and high-cost governments would face the same
world and local prices with no tariff revenue. The only differential in their welfare functions is that
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the high-cost government has the term (tH−θH)Qx(t= tH, τ=0) while the low-cost government has
the term (tH−θL)Qx(t= tH, τ=0). Thus the RHS of Eq. (A4) is
Wxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0; hH Þ þ ðhH−hLÞQxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0Þ
¼ Wxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ; hHÞ þ ðhH−hLÞQxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0Þ
¼ Wxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ; hLÞ þ ðhH−hLÞðQxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0Þ−Qxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHW ÞÞ:
The first equality is direct from Eq. (A2). The second equality is also immediate: the low-cost
government has an additional efficiency cost (θH−θL)Qx(t=θH, τ=τH″ ) under the policies (θH, τH″ ).
The proof of Eq. (A1) then boils down to the proof of
Qxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0ÞNQxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHWÞ:
Since Qx(·) strictly increases in price, the inequality holds if and only if
pˆsxðt ¼ tH ; s ¼ 0ÞN pˆsxðt ¼ hH ; s ¼ sHWÞ;
which in turn is equivalent to
2bþ /
bþ / N
sHW−0
hH−tH
: ðA5Þ
To prove that Eq. (A5) holds, note first that
g
bþ g ¼
sHW−0
hH− te N sHW−0hH−tH ;
where the equality is from Eq. (A3) and the inequality is due to t˜N tH. From the assumption made
on the parameters,
2bþ /
bþ / N
g
bþ g :
Hence, the inequality Eq. (A5) holds. □
Proof of Corollary 1. (ii) Under free trade, the first-best choice of tL from a worldwide
perspective is θL. Lowering tL below θL or raising it above θL causes some inefficiencies; either
way, the worldwide cooperative welfare symmetrically decreases for a given τ=0, as was implied
by the first-order condition (4) in the absence of the terms-of-trade term. If the gap θH−θL is
sufficiently small, then governments would prefer assign tL to θH rather than to S L, which means
that a pooling with tL= tH=θH would be preferred to a separating of tL= S L and tH=θH, so as to
achieve incentive compatibility. This implies that if θH−θL is sufficiently small, then the “optimal”
pooling with tL= tH=E(θ) is preferred to the separating with tL= S L and tH=θH. The optimal
pooling, in turn, is dominated by a separating with tL=E(θ) and tH=θH for some τHN0. □
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Plugging pˆx
s(t, τ) into the equation t=θ− (λx−1)Qx( pˆxs) /γ yields
tPE h; kx; sð Þ ¼ hð/þ gþ 2bÞ−ðkx−1Þð2aþ ðbþ /ÞsÞ/þ gþ 2b−ðkx−1Þð/þ 2bÞ :
Given the parameter range in the text, tPE rises with θ but falls with λx for a given τ.
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(ii) We first prove the sufficiency. The first derivatives of the domestic welfare function are
AWx
As
¼ bþ gð ÞMx pˆxð Þ− bþ /ð Þ bþ gð Þsþ g bþ /ð Þ t−hð Þ þ kx−1ð Þ bþ /ð ÞQx pˆsx
 
AWx
At
¼ −gMx pˆxð Þ þ g bþ /ð Þs−g 2bþ /ð Þ t−hð Þ− kx−1ð Þ 2bþ /ð ÞQx pˆsx
 
:
Consider a linear function that is tangent to the domestic welfare function and has slope γ /
(β+γ). Let the domestic government choose any policy mix along the linear function. Then the
first two terms in both equations, corresponding to −Mx(∂pxw/∂τ)+τ(∂Mx/∂τ) and −Mx(∂pxw/∂t)+
τ (∂Mx/∂t), are reduced to zero, since pxw andMx are held constant along the line. Hence, the first-
order conditions lead to t=θ− (λx−1)Qx(pˆxs) /γ, and thus t= tPE(θ,λx;τ).We next prove the
necessity. If t= tPE(θ,λx;τ), then the last two terms in both equations are reduced to zero. Hence, the
tangent of the domestic welfare function has the slope dτ/dt=− (∂Wx/∂t)/(∂Wx/∂τ)=γ / (β+γ). □
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